The Principles of War Podcast
8 Concentration of Force in the Malaya Campaign

8 – Concentration of Force in the Malaya Campaign

If you are viewing this page on a Secured Network, you will not be able to see the webpage podcast player, so the best way to listen to the podcast is either on this page from a civilian PC, visit this page on your mobile phone or download the podcast episode either on an Android podcast player like Castbox or Podcast Addict or on the Apple Podcasts Player from iTunes.

Malaya was a secondary effort of secondary effort for both the British and the Japanese – so how does Concentration of Force work for secondary efforts?

Force Z was HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. A force too small to effect the outcome, but too large to lose.  How did Admiral Tom Phillips plan to interdict the Japanese landing forces?  What is the role of the naval LO?  Why did CAPT Tennant disobey orders about radio silence?

1 Squadron RAAF conduct the first air strike against the Japanese in WW2, but the RAAF support for Force Z was too little, too late?  Why?

Churchill described this as the most direct shock that he had ever received after Force Z was sunk.  Force Z was the first capital ships sunk by air power alone, this is a great example of technological surprise.

The Japanese create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation – how did this impact the British decision making.

Don’t penny packet your Battleships!

The IJA stacked the deck in aircraft.  More aircraft and aircraft that were better with better pilots – this helped swing the balance for the Japanese.

The force ratios for the Japanese were very low.  They never achieved overwhelmingly combat power, but they achieved overwhelming success.

They had 11 Divisions for their land operations across the Pacific AO.  How did Yamashita entirely pay off Concentration of Force and still succeed?

Leadership, training, doctrine, planning, morale, combined arms and audacity.  Do this and pay off Concentration of Force at your leisure.

“Read this alone and the war can be won” was the book that built the moral case for the offensive and covered the tactics as well that would lead to victory.





Related posts

16 – Malaya Campaign After Action Review Part I

James Eling

57 – The Battle of Long Tan logistics and C2

James Eling

72 – Panzergruppe Kleist – German Centre of Gravity – Battle of France Part VIII


1 comment

Leave a Comment