This Episode looks at the lessons for the employment of Artillery at the 1st Battle of Bullecourt. CEW Bean, the author of the official History wrote that Australian troops braved the odds in numerous battles, but that Bullecourt was the most
brilliant of these achievements, impressing both enemy and friends alike.
This Bullecourt miniseries is part of our 150th Anniversary of the Royal Australian Artillery series.
We look at the strategic picture in 1917, with Germany realising that time is on the side of the Allies. The commencement of unrestricted warfare is an attempt to deny Great Britain the resources required to remain in the war, setting the conditions for the war to be won, before the United States mobilisation makes victory impossible.
The last of the ANZAC Divisions arrived on the Western Front in November 1916 – this was Monash’s 3rd Australian Infantry Division. On the 23rd of February, German troops started thinning out the line and Operation Alberich, the withdrawal to the Siegfried Line.
In December 1916, Joffre was replaced with General Robert Nivelle. Originally Lloyd George wanted to place Haig under Nivelle, which would have simplified command arrangements, but Haig would not countenance the idea. Haig was keen to create his own breakthrough if possible, but this would be difficult with the main effort, the Nivelle Offensive, receiving the majority of the guns and ammunition.
Bullcourt, in the Queant area was to support Allenby’s Third Army’s attack at Arras. Allenby’s attack was also supported at Vimy by the Canadian Corps under LT GEN Byng. This will be the subject of another podcast partially to celebrate 150 years of Canadian Artillery – UBIQUE!, and partially to compare and contrast with Bullecourt. The Battle at Bullecourt literally became the textbook example of how not to conduct a battle – it was taught in British Staff Colleges of the dangers of poor planning. Vimy Ridge is almost the perfect juxtaposition – Byng vs Gough, detailed planning vs big hands small map, artillery vs no artillery, CBSO vs little effective counter battery effects, ammunition allocation (50,000 tons were fired in pre H-Hour fires), vs an inadequate allocation, enough guns vs clearly insufficient numbers of batteries, and coordination and cooperation across corps vs little coordination. The Vimy Ridge battle was an exemplar of how to attack a strongly defended objective in the First World War and many of the techniques developed at Vimy would be used by Monash in 1918 in his first Battle as Corps Commander in the Battle of Hamel.
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[…] follows on from our Bullecourt series. The Battle of Bullecourt occurred 48 hours later and 30 km south of the Battle of […]