Our Kokoda Campaign series contines as we start to look at issues at the Operational Level of war. This episode continues the story of the Kokoda Campaign, predominantly through the story of the 53rd Battalion because it highlights the issues with accelerated mobilisation in time of war.
These are just the show notes. Be sure to listen to the full episode – it includes important lessons around the psychological preparation for troops in combat.
The Psychological toll on soldiers in combat
The lack of preparation, training and leadership for the soldiers on the track exacerbated the normal intense psychological pressures on soldiers. The pressure of the lack of training and the feeling of strategic hopelessness inflicted a mental breakdown on one of the OCs of the 53rd Battalion. We also discuss some of the findings of David Woolley’s excellent book “Not yet diagnosed” which examined the issues of psychological injuries during the Kokoda Campaign.
Woolley examines the incidence of Self Inflicted Wounds on the track, this highlights the toll that jungle warfare has on troops who haven’t trained in the Jungle. He also highlights the impact of losing a Commanding Officer. We see the precipitous slide in the performance of the 53rd Battalion after the death of LTCOL Kenneth Ward.
The Difference between the Operation and Strategic Levels of War
LWD 1 – The Fundamentals of Land Power defines the two levels of war.
Operational level. The operational level of command encompasses planning and
conducting campaigns incorporating joint forces. A campaign is a series of
simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve one or more strategic
objectives. Military actions at the operational level are joint, often coalition, and
invariably interagency in nature. The operational level achieves military strategic
objectives by orchestrating, sequencing and resourcing tactical actions and
efforts. Successful campaigning is founded on the creative application of
operational art.
Operational art is the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives
in a theatre of operations through the design, organisation and conduct of
campaigns and major operations. Primarily cognitive rather than organisational, it
features the creation and sequencing of a series of tactical actions to achieve
abstract strategic ends. Operational art links strategy and tactics and aims to set
the conditions most likely to achieve the strategic objectives.
In a campaign, a line of operation is a philosophical sequence of operations each
of which assists in the achievement of particular strategic objectives. In a generic
sense, a line of operation describes where military effort is applied to achieve the
end-state. This allows land forces to sequence and resource main and secondary
efforts. Multiple lines of operation may be utilised to create an operational level
framework from which to consider the diverse array of tactical actions required to
achieve assigned objectives.
The strategic level of command is responsible for coordinating the application of
national power to achieve an end-state favourable to the national interest. The
strategic level focuses on the development and implementation of strategy as the
identification of objectives (ends), concepts (ways) and the resources (means)
necessary to achieve them. At this level, all the elements of national power are
employed in a manner that maximise their overall effectiveness.
National policy and strategy integrates all the elements of national power to
employ a whole-of-government approach to national security. The government
considers how it will employ national power to secure the nation and/or protect its
interests. It determines the national strategic objectives, which tools of national
power to employ and what resources, military or otherwise are required. This
includes the mobilisation, posture and preparation of whole-of-government tools
and the potential impact of their employment. The political dimension or impact,
both domestically and internationally, is a key factor in any government’s
consideration of the use of military power.
As we look the the Operational Level – the critical link between Strategy and Tactics, we will examine the Area of Operations, which includes Kanga Force at Wau and Salamau and the Japanese at Milne Bay. The LTGEN Syd Rowell the Commander of New Guinea Force, he has Japanese landing at Milne Bay on the night of the 25th of August, just one day before the start of the Battle of Isurava. Here we see the see the Operational, Strategic and Tactical levels of war laid out and clearly defined. This makes it an excellent example of the Tactical, Operational and Strategic levels of war.
MAJGEN Arnold Potts (Commander Maroubra Force) is fighting the Japanese at Isurava at the TACTICAL LEVEL.
LTGEN Syd Rowell (Commander New Guinea Force) is fighting the Japanese at Wau, Isurava and Milne Bay at the OPERATIONAL LEVEL.
LTGEN Blamey (Commander in Chief of AMF) is fighting across North Africa, New Guinea and with RAAF pilots in Australia and the United Kingdom. Part of the 6th Division has just returned from Ceylon and Navy was conducting a wide range of tasks. He is also responsible for force-generating reinforcements and planning future campaigns. This is at the MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL. At the NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL, (Grand Strategy) considerations include getting the workforce balance right between the military and the civilian workforce to manufacture arms and ammunition and to bring in the harvest and what the long term force design should look like given the available resources, as well as how we can best coordinate with our allies and starting to think about post war considerations.
Australia has been strategically surprised by the Japanese Pacific offensive (which has already seen the capture of the 8th Division) and is struggling to make the transition from Imperial Defence to Defence of the Nation. This will impact readiness, manoeuvre, logistics and combat capability at the Operational Level.
