This episode looks at the JIPOE (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment) or IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for the Kokoda Campaign.
This episode is part of our Kokoda Campaign Series, focusing on Isurava and the mobilisation of soldiers to defend
Before we get stuck into how the JMAP was conducted (Spoilers! It wasn’t and that is a critical failing of BRIG Basil Morris), we look at the psychological impact of employing troops unprepared for jungle warfare. We continue the discussion about psychological casualties at Isurava – but this time linking it to the Manoeuvrist approach. Are we not seeing the manifestation of the manoeuvrist approach at Isurava? Troops, untrained for jungle warfare, are presented with a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which they cannot cope.
MAJGEN Basil Morris, the Commander of the 8th Military District had risen rapidly up the ranks and had little operational experience. This goes someway to explaining the lack of preparation for the defence of Port Moresby.
The episode looks at what the Australians knew about the terrain and the environment in which they would shortly become decisively engaged in a desperate defensive battle. Time in reconnaissance may be seldom wasted, but no reconnaissance is a very bold course of action. This is what Morris missed and it would create issues for his understanding of the problem. As would the lack of maps for his troops. There was plenty of time to fix both these issues, had he understood their importance and allocated a small amount of resources to it.
A quick appreciation of the terrain is conducted using the JIPOE process from the Joint Military Appreciation Process. One component of a Joint Appreciation is looking at the Sea Lines of Communication. These were critical in LTGEN Syd Rowell’s appreciation of the problem. Without control of SLOCs, it would be impossible to resupply any forces committed to the AO. Is this why until the Battle of the Coral Sea New Guinea Force was treated more like one of the Bird Forces?
As a part of the terrain appreciation / Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, we discuss ‘The Gap’ – the decisive terrain that could be held by a section against all comers. The key issue with the defence of the Gap was that it did not actually exist. That made it less useful in defensive planning. Just as useless was suggestions that a road should be built across the Owen Stanley Ranges, clearly advice offered by an Officer who had never actually been to New Guinea to see the terrain.
How did the environment effect the troops? Clearly, malaria from the anopheles mosquitoes was to have a large impact on the generation of combat power. This had a large impact on the Kokoda Campaign but would be a much bigger issue at Milne Bay, where the mosquito came close to causing the culmination of the Australian troops based there.
