This episode looks at the barriers to successfully preparing for combat against the Japanese in the Jungle and is part of our series on the Kokoda Campaign and Mobilisation. This is the third part of an interview with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in Australian Army Doctrine Development in the Second World War. He is the author of Jungle Warriors, an excellent book with a wide range of lessons on how the Army learnt to fight in the jungle.
These are just the show notes for the podcast, be sure to listen to the podcast for the full story.
Lessons learnt from the Fall of Singapore
After the fall of Singapore in February 1942, crucial lessons were quickly captured by the Australian Army from Lieutenant Colonel Ian Stewart of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Widely regarded as the best battalion commander in the Singapore campaign, Stewart’s experiences and knowledge were seen as invaluable for understanding how to combat Japanese forces in jungle warfare. Within days of Singapore’s surrender, Australian officers Major General Tubby Allen and Brigadier Berryman interviewed Stewart while en route from Java to Ceylon, capturing vital insights on surviving and fighting in jungle conditions, the Japanese way of war and most importantly, how to counter the way the Japanese fought.
These interviews formed the basis of the Australian Army Training Memorandums (ATM) 7, 8, and 9, distributed widely across the army between February and April 1942. Tragically – these ATMs where not used by either 21st or 30th Brigades as they prepared their soldiers for combat. These documents were pivotal in shaping the training of Australian forces after the key battles like Kokoda and Milne Bay, laying the groundwork for jungle warfare techniques. These memos predated Major General Bennett’s ATM 10, suggesting Stewart’s contributions were foundational to Australian training.
US Army and Marine Corps Learnings for Jungle Warfare
In parallel, Colonel Francis Brink, a United States Army observer, produced a document titled Tactical Methods 1942, summarizing the Malayan campaign and offering further insights on fighting in the jungle. Brink’s document was distributed by General Wavell across the Southwest Pacific and India, and later adopted by the Australian Chief of General Staff for military training. This showed a broad, early recognition of the importance of shared knowledge between Allied forces in jungle combat.
While some Australian units, such as the Independent Companies, had specialized guerrilla warfare training, most units in 1942 learned through experience on the battlefield. The Independent Companies, trained at the guerrilla warfare camp in Foster, focused on long-range patrolling and intelligence gathering, operating similarly to later SAS patrols during the Vietnam War.
Challenges in Preparing for Combat
The process of synthesizing these lessons into doctrine faced significant challenges. While individual units were able to adapt and develop jungle warfare tactics on their own, there was a lack of centralized training and information dissemination. Lessons were often repeated across different units without being systematically shared, largely due to the decentralized nature of training and a shortage of qualified staff at the Directorate of Military Training (DMT). For instance, diagrams on jungle movement and tactics were created by different divisions at various times, but these lessons were not consolidated until much later.
The lack of centralized coordination was partially due to the Australian Army’s best staff officers being sent to the Middle East, leaving the home front with fewer experienced personnel. It wasn’t until the establishment of the Conungra Jungle Warfare Training Centre in late 1942 and the Australian Recruit Training Centre in early 1943 that more structured and standardized training systems emerged.
By the middle of 1943, after key campaigns like Milne Bay and the Kokoda Track, the Australian Army was able to fully integrate these lessons into their jungle warfare doctrine, creating a more organized and effective training program for the rest of the war.
This process of learning through direct experience, informal unit exchanges, and eventual centralization highlighted the challenges of wartime adaptation and the importance of capturing and disseminating battlefield knowledge in real-time.
