This episode looks at how the lessons learnt process in jungle warfare doctrine development and is part of our series on the Kokoda Campaign and Mobilisation. This is the second part of an interview with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in Australian Army Doctrine Development in the Second World War. He is the author of Jungle Warriors, an excellent book with a wide range of lessons on how the Army learnt to fight in the jungle.
These are just the show notes for the podcast, be sure to listen to the podcast for the full story.
The difference between military innovation and adaptation
There is much debate about the difference between innovation and adaptation in the military. For the purposes of this series, we use innovation to describe more radical changes in tactics, techniques and procedures, (TTPs) versus adaptation which tends to be more gradual in nature and in direct relation to changing combat situations.
The need for innovation and adaptation comes from changes in the 3 Ts – Terrain, Technology or Threat. Combat with the Japanese differed from the Australian Army’s natural TTPs in regard to the terrain and threat. The Japanese fought very differently to the German Army and the terrain was polar opposite to the deserts of the Middle East.
Adaptation and Innovation can also be top down, eg the introduction of the Jungle Scales Division, or bottom up, eg Platoon contact drills in the jungle. In all circumstances, the Lessons Learnt process is critical for recording and disseminating the lessons, along with an overarching coordination process that should be provided the Army Headquarters.
Innovation and adaptation can also occur in or out of contact. In contact gives much quicker feedback and creates ‘the burning deck’ for change, but is hindered by casualties and the friction that limits lessons learnt capture. Out of contact allows more time and deeper thought, however there is no feedback, so an Army can easily innovate a long way in the wrong direction and without rigouress wargaming and
Some argue that innovation and adaptation can have a negative impact on combat operations, for example the American Army decreasing patrolling in Vietnam to decrease mine casualties and lower the risk of ambush, which had the unintended consequence of ceding villages and terrain to the enemy. This highlights the art of war, with the imperative to innovate and adapt in ways that support the strategic endstate, not limit it.
For more information about military innovation, check out our military innovation archives, which include examples from the Battles of Vimy Ridge and the Bismarck Sea.
Jungle Warfare Doctrine Development in the Australian Army During WWII
During World War II, the Australian Army faced one of its most challenging adversaries: the Japanese Army, which was well-versed in jungle warfare. The Australian Army’s initial encounters in the jungles of Malaya and Papua and New Guinea highlighted a significant gap in their preparedness to fight in such an environment. The development of jungle warfare doctrine became an urgent necessity, driven by a series of costly engagements and the Allies losing significant terrain.
Early Struggles in the Jungle
The fall of Singapore in February 1942 was a major wake-up call for the Australian Army. The swift and decisive Japanese advance through the Malayan Peninsula demonstrated their mastery of jungle warfare. The Japanese forces utilized the dense jungle to their advantage, conducting surprise attacks and manoeuvering rapidly, leaving the Allied forces in disarray. The Australian troops, like their British and Indian counterparts, were ill-prepared for the rigorus of jungle combat. Reports from these early battles consistently highlighted the need for better camouflage, more automatic weapons, and improved communication systems as well as the ability to withstand being outflank and having supply lines cut off.
Despite these reports being sent back to the Australian Land Headquarters (LHQ), there was little immediate action taken. The administrative apparatus at LHQ was overwhelmed, understaffed, and struggled to synthesize and act upon the information being received from the frontlines. The Directorate of Military Training, which was responsible for analyzing and disseminating such information, was particularly under-resourced, with only a handful of officers available to process the deluge of reports.
The Frustration of Inaction
One of the most frustrating aspects of this period was the repetition of the same lessons from different units across various campaigns, all pointing to similar needs and deficiencies. Yet, the Australian Army’s response was slow. For example, units consistently reported the need for automatic weapons like Thompson submachine guns, yet these requests were often dismissed or delayed by higher command. This institutional resistance to change was compounded by a lack of trust in the observations and suggestions coming from the front lines.
The Australian Army’s failure to adapt quickly was evident in their preparation for the Kokoda Campaign. By the time elements of the 7th Division were deployed to Papua New Guinea in 1942, little had changed in terms of equipment or tactics. Australian soldiers were still wearing the same uniforms they had worn in the Middle East, which were ill-suited for jungle warfare. Their webbing, still coated in white Blanco, stood out against the jungle foliage, making them easy targets for the Japanese.
Grassroots Adaptation and Innovation
Despite the lack of formal action, adaptation began to occur at the grassroots level. Units started taking matters into their own hands, making unofficial modifications to their equipment and tactics. For instance, some soldiers dyed their uniforms with whatever was available, including coffee, to better blend into the jungle environment. Others traded or procured additional weapons and equipment through informal channels, recognizing the inadequacies in their standard issue gear.
One striking example involved a battalion commander who, recognizing the need for more automatic weapons, negotiated with a field regiment to exchange a bottle of whiskey for their Thompson submachine guns. This kind of initiative, though unofficial, was crucial in filling the gaps left by the slow-moving military bureaucracy and is an excellent example of bottom-up adaptation to a changed tactical situation.
Lessons Learned
The development of jungle warfare doctrine in the Australian Army during WWII was a process marked by initial failure and slow adaptation, but also by grassroots innovation and determination. The experience underscored the importance of being able to quickly adapt to new and challenging combat environments. It highlighted the need for a responsive and flexible command structure that could efficiently process and act upon intelligence and field reports.
Ultimately, the Australian Army did learn to fight in the jungle, but it was a hard-won knowledge, paid for with the lives of many soldiers who were thrust into battle with inadequate preparation. These lessons would inform future military doctrine, ensuring that subsequent generations of Australian soldiers were better prepared for the unique challenges of jungle warfare.
The Australian Army’s journey to developing an effective jungle warfare doctrine during World War II was a testament to the resilience and ingenuity of its soldiers and junior leaders. While the higher command’s inertia initially hampered progress, the ability of those on the ground to adapt and innovate ensured that the Australian Army could eventually meet the challenges posed by the Japanese in the unforgiving jungles of Southeast Asia.
There are clear lessons for Armies look to adapt to the modern battlefield. Most recently we see the lessons learnt process in action in Ukraine, with rapid iterations of innovation.
