No. 75 Squadron deployed to Port Moresby on the 17th of March, 1942. This miniseries looks at the brave exploits of the pilots and ground crew of No 75 Squadron during their 44 day deployment to Port Moresby. This episode looks at how well the RAAF was prepared for combat in 1942. These are just the show notes – for the full No. 65 Squadron story, listen to the podcast episode on your favourite podcast player.
Prime Minister Robert Menzies declared war on Germany on the 3rd of September, 1939. Darwin was first bombed on the 19th of February, 1942. It was 900 days from the Australian declaration of war and the bombing of Darwin. For Darwin’s defence, there were exactly zero RAAF aircraft to defend Australia from that attack. This is even though the first Japanese bombing of Port Moresby had occurred on the 3rd of February, just 16 days prior. Thus, it is no surprise that one senior RAAF officer stated in February 1942 that the RAAF had “Hardly a feather to fly with.”
LTGEN Kenney, commanding officer of the US Fifth Air Force, stated, “In this theatre, our artillery flies.” That may be so, but in February 1942, it did not, and even by August, there was scant air power to support Australian troops on the Kokoda Track. This miniseries, part of our Kokoda Campaign series, looks to understand why there was minimal air support for troops fighting the Japanese during the Kokoda Campaign. Air power can be a component of the Combined Arms equation, and yet in this case it would play a negligible role which would have a profound impact on the Australian defenders, who initially did not even have their Vickers medium machine guns, let alone artillery.
The brave story of the pilots of No. 75 Squadron has an eerie echo of that of the soldiers on the ground on the Kokoda Track. Both would taste the bitter fruits of the Singapore Strategy. Both would fight battles where the Japanese had temporally dislocated Australia at the Strategic level. Both would substitute bravery and desperation for training and doctrine.
The founding of the RAAF
In 1920, Billy Hughes, Australian Prime Minister, gave a speech stating that the Government would provide funds for the creation of an Air Force. The Air Force’s purpose was primarily the defence of Australia from Japan – the most likely threat. On March the 31st, 1921 the Australian Air Force was formed. At this point, it had 164 aircraft (many still in packing crates as they had been gifted to Australia by Great Britain) and it had 151 personnel. There were more aircraft in the Australian Air Force than there were personnel! The designation ‘Royal’ was added in August 1921. Wing commander Richard Williams becomes the Chief of the Air Staff at the ripe old age of 32.
Preparations for war in the RAAF
The role of CAS would rotate between Williams and Stanley Goble. This would create problems and the culture of the RAAF became one that prided itself on daring and elan, rather than professional flying. This would lead to the Ellington Report
The Australian Government would request a British Officer to serve as the Chief of the Air Staff. This would have dire consequences for the RAAF and the nation as decisions would be taken to support the Singapore Strategy, and would be considered from the point of view of Britain, not that of Australia.
Just before Australia would declare war, the RAAF strength was 3,489 personnel, 310 of whom were officers. However, there were just 246 aircraft. None of them would be classed as modern. We had 82 Ansons, 54 Demons, 7 Wirraways, 21 Seagull seaplanes and 82 trainer aircraft. There were just 12 squadrons. Two of those were just a nucleus and four were Citizen Air Force squadrons.
Just before Australia would declare war, the RAAF strength was 3,489 personnel, 310 of whom were officers. However, there were just 246 aircraft. None of them would be classed as modern. We had 82 Ansons, 54 Demons, 7 Wirraways, 21 Seagull seaplanes and 82 trainer aircraft. There were just 12 squadrons. Two of those were just a nucleus and four were Citizen Air Force squadrons.
As Britain becomes increasingly decisively engaged, the logical fallacy in the Singapore Strategy becomes increasingly apparent.
The Empire Air Training Scheme
There were more RAAF pilots in Britain than there were in Australia. Britain at this point of the war was planning on producing 2,250 aircraft a month. Britain had been planning pre-war and it was estimated that they would need 50,000 aircrew trained every year. They thought that they would only be able to train 22,000 a year. They planned to rely on the other 28,000 coming from the Commonwealth and that meant Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Minister for Air James Fairbairn, went to Canada in November 1939 to discuss the Empire Air Training Scheme. Under the Empire Air Training Scheme, or EATS, Australia agreed to train 11,000 aircrew each year until 1943. The scheme ran until June 1944 and Australia up to that point had sent 37,810 personnel.
Mobilisation of the RAAF
The rapid mobilisation and training requirements took an incredibly toll within the RAAF. During the Second World War, 485 Australian aircraft were lost to enemy action. However, 740 were lost in accidents at flight training schools. So for every two that were lost in combat, three were lost in accidents in Australia. Bill Dean Butcher was the medical officer of 75 Squadron while it was based at Port Moresby. He stated that he did more identifying of remains and burials while he was posted to One Operational Training Unit that was based at Bairnsdale and prepared pilots to fly the Beaufort bomber. Accidents were so common that it was nicknamed Death Valley. And by the end of the war, One OTU would have 131 aircrew dead or missing.
The next Episode will look at the training of the pilots in No 75 Squadon and how they deployed to Port Moresby.
