How did the Australian Army generate the Combined Arms effect during the Kokoda Campaign? That is, of course, a trick question. There was no combined arms effect from the Australian Army and this podcast looks at why our soldiers fought without the benefit of Combined Arms. We also discuss the effort put into generating Combined Arms by the Japanese and compare lessons learnt from Goose Green in the Falklands and 2nd El Alamein.
What is Combined Arms?
LWD 1 states that a combined arms team is a case by case mix of combat support and combat service support and command support elements tailored to a specific combination of mission, threat and terrain. Increasingly, this will include joint and interagency components. Each team aims to cover the vulnerability of one part of the force with the strength of another. It also presents a dilemma for the enemy by triggering actions to protect against one threat that increases vulnerability to another.
We also discuss the UK JDP 0-20 – UK Land Power –
The combined arms approach is the synchronised and simultaneous application of tactical forces and capabilities across operational domains to create an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. Through task organisation, it reinforces strengths and compensates for weaknesses through complementary grouping. It also imposes dilemmas on opponents by confronting them with multiple threats; forces are task-organised so that if the opponent attempts to protect against one threat, they become vulnerable to another.
This is from the War of the Rocks article, “The Changing Character of Combined Arms“.
Just like war, there is an enduring nature and changing character to combined arms. Combined arms involve combining capabilities in a simultaneous manner to prevail. Traditionally, this combination involved indirect and direct fire to support ground maneuver and closing with the enemy. For Stephen Biddle, the essence of combined arms is captured in the concept of force employment. Warfighting is less about mass and more about maneuver, using tempo and targeting to put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma that reduces cohesion. Seen another way, combined arms is about the combination of effects: fire and maneuver, direct and indirect approaches across domains, orthodox and unorthodox ways and means. Combined arms reduce the decision space of the adversary. The more effects a force brings to bear in time and space, the more likely the enemy system is to collapse.
What is the Combined Arms Dilemma?
When faced with artillery, the best option for defends is to place themselves under Stage 3 Over Head Protection. This keeps them safe from all but the most precise of strikes from artillery. It protects against air burst rounds and even the effect of nearby delay. A very lucky round into the bunker is required to inflict casualties. This highlights one of the issues with artillery – most of the casualties occur in the first 30 seconds of the fire mission, as troops rush to find protection. Artillery in Combined Arms, however, does not have the primary intent to inflict casualties, it denies the enemy the ability to defend themselves whilst the fire mission is in progress and the infantry or armour is advancing. During the advance, the dilemma is to either protect yourself from the artillery and allow the armour and/or infantry to advance or to defend yourself against armour and infantry in the open and take casualties from the artillery.
How did the Japanese Army generate combined arms in the Kokoda Campaign?
The IJA was supported by four guns, the Type 92 Battalion gun, the Type 94 37mm anti-tank gun, the confusingly named Type 94 75mm gun and the knee mortar. The Type 92 gun had been handed down from the artillery to the infantry for use as an integral fire support weapon. The Type 94s were named after the year of introduction – 2594 on the Imperial Calendar. The antitank gun, despite the Allies having no tanks, was quite useful, being light and providing considerable firepower out to 2,870 meters. The Type 94 mountain gun had a range of 8,000 meters and could fire 15 rounds per minute for 2 minutes.
The knee mortar was a misnomer. The Type 89 grenade discharged was placed on the ground, not the knee as it would have broken the leg. With a range of 670 meters and a 50mm round it fired HE, frag, incendiary and a prac round. The HE round weighed .91 kg.
Japanese logistics support to the Artillery.
The log support to any formation is critical in generating combat power. Listen to the podcast to determine how much effort went into providing the support to feed the guns. Peter Williams’ book, The Kokoda Campaign, 1942: Myth and Reality has an excellent chapter on how fire support was provided and how critical it was to the Japanese offensive. The morale impact was significant with Australian troops often unable to respond when they had no weapons that could range the Japanese guns. The only choice was to either endure the shelling or to retreat.
Why did Australian troops not have combined arms support?
A combination of untrained commanders, and not understanding the importance of combined arms (this is less the case with the 21st Brigade Officers – they were 2nd AIF in the 7th Division and had experience in the Middle East. Logistics difficulties were viewed as being insurmountable. A lack of porters over a very steep and narrow track meant there wasn’t the ability to
Capt Hugh Dalby talks us through how LTCOL Ralph Honner ensured that his attack, during the Battle of the Beaches. The assault was well supported by Artillery and the full effect of combined arms was bought to bear on Japanese troops who were well dug in, but still unable to defend their position, once impaled on the horns of a dilemma, as all should combined arms assault should create.
Have a listen to the podcast on your favourite podcast player for all of the details about Japanese Combined Arms on the Kokoda track.
