The German Centre of Gravity, Part II is part of our Battle of France series of podcasts.
We discuss the task before Panzergruppe Kleist as it becomes the German Schwerpunkt – indeed the Strategic German Centre of Gravity. It follows on from Part VII series, where we discussed the way that Hitler, the gambler had temporally and functionally dislocated the Wehrmacht from their tasks.
To properly conduct the German Centre of Gravity analysis it is important to understand the economic state. We use the Ends, Ways and Means methodology to determine the German Centre of Gravity. With no options at the Strategic level, Hitler was forced to use an Operational level Centre of Gravity to attempt to snatch a Victory from France, how had the largest armed force on the continent and intimidating defences along their border.
“Even if the operation only had a 10% chance of success, I would stick to it. It alone will lead to the enemy’s annihilation.”
General der Artillerie Franz Halder,
The principles of Operational Planning is not the employment of miracles, and yet General der Infantrie Blumentritt described the triple miracle of the Blitzkrieg –
- The longest traffic jam in the history of Europe with Panzer Group Kleiste’s 41,440 vehicles backed up through Ardennes forest on 11 May, unmolested by Allied aircraft.
- The breakthrough at Sedan occured in just a few hours.
- As the Panzer divions rushed to the Channel Coast, their flanks were completely exposed. The feared Allied counteroffensive, apart from the Arras counterattack, failed to materialise.
The sweet fruit of the Blitzkrieg victory would have a bitter aftertaste when the Wehrmacht attempted to repeat the miracle in the Soviet Union. With far more space to trade for time and no coast to pin the Soviet Armies against, numbers would tell for a lot more than they did in France.
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4 comments
I just finished this series on the Battle of France and truly enjoyed it. I had a two day 1300 mile drive and listened to it all on the first day. I am a plant ecologist and teach ecological and evolutionary theory. As I listened I had the epiphany that considering the desired end state and center of gravity of individual organisms and species as they struggle for resources needed for survival and reproduction is an excellent way to make those complex ecological ideas approachable for my students….Thank you for a job well done
Hi Hoyt, that is a very interesting insight. I’m glad you liked it!
Sadly, for my sins, I’m an OCS Portsea graduate- so that immediately dates me as being very old!
Have listened to the entire suite on the battle for France- loved it. Wish we had access to this kind of resource when we were conducting our TEWTs back in the day!
A small point of order though, is Guderian’s background plays a major factor in his ability to drive his force through the Ardenne. Even though he had been an infantry officer, he commanded the battalion signals Platoon in WW1- this taught him two things, the value of comms forward and rearwards, and how to combine arms with wireless – particulalry artillery support. This led to his very strange behaviour of having his HQ in two special build vehicles, one with comms to his forward units, and the second with comms to rear HQ, Artillery and importantly- the Luftwaffe Stuka squadrons placed in support. Other Generals adopted the tried and true HQ of a sumptuous chateau, and thought of Guderin’s option as quite mad. But it allowed him to stay close to the front, and was able to manoeuvre units quickly.
Secondly, as a teenager, he had spent many years in the Ardenne. Not sure if he lived there, or holidayed with relatives- but he knew the roads and forests as he used to go shooting there.
Lastly, he had spent time in logistics command in the interwar years- and he learnt to think of warfighting as a logistical requirement. He understood supply- a rare thing for an infantry general. It was in this role, about 1934, when he first introduced to a panzer… and the rest, as they say, is history.
Len Deighton’s 1978 book on Blitzkrieg is my source. In that there is also a fabulous interview with Guderian’s chief of staff, as he was just an old retired german general in 1978, and very happy to discuss the French and Polish campaigns with hindsight. He states the war was lost when Hitler ordered a 3 day halt in France, which allowed the BEF to escape at Dunkirk. Guderian wanted to press on and close the salient, but was stopped. Apparently, he was furious!
Guderian was, without doubt, the right man for that job at that time.
Great podcast though. Loved it.
Cameron – you are quite correct. I am not sure whether Guderians posting history was part of brilliant career management, punishment for his actions in the Freikorps, or a mix of both. Either way, without the extensive non Corps postings, he would not have been the Tank officer that he become. He was rare in having an understanding of combat, communications and logistics. His risks were calculated in comparison to Rommel.