The Principles of War Podcast
16 Malaya Campaign After Action Review Part I

16 – Malaya Campaign After Action Review Part I

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There is a new definition of the Manoeuvrist Approach – In the time that we have been producing the Malaya Campaign series in The Principles of War, the Australian Army has produced a new version of the LWD 3-0, so Army Doctrine is moving faster than this podcast!

We look at the new doctrine and the application of Manoeuvre Warfare and how it relates to the Malaya Campaign.  Is Malaya the best example of the Manoeuvrist Approach that the Australian Army has ever been involved in?

We look at the  application of tenets of manoeuvre theory.

  • Focusing friendly action on the adversary centre of gravity.
  • Achieving surprise.
  • Identify and prioritising a main effort.
  • Utilising deception.
  • Reconnaissance pull.
  • Operation Tempo
  • Combined arms teams.
  • Applications of joint fires and effects.

How did the Imperial

We discuss how the logistics tail for the Japanese could have been the critical vulnerability that the Allies could have targeted.

We discuss the question what would it have been if the 9th Division had been in Malaya rather than the 8th Division?

Got a favourite Australian military quote?  Let us know, we are crowdsourcing a list of best quotes about and by Australians.

We discuss how the Japanese were able to target the Allied moral centre of gravity and how the Asia for the Asian memes undermine the effectiveness of the British Army in Malaya.

With surprise, we look at the strategic surprise that the Allies experienced with Malaya.  The fact that the Singapore strategy was well understood, especially by people like MAJ GEN Lavarack, who was arguing for a better ability to defend the country.

We look at Group Captain John Lerew and his famous signal “Morituri vos salutamus”.  What would cause him to signal his higher headquarters “Those who about to die, salute you.”

What effect did a racial bias play in the intelligence appreciation of the Japanese capabilities, especially given the kind of operations that the Japanese were conducting in places like Shanghai.



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